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Task	 Main	Instructions	 Other	Information	Grocery	List	Mean	Difficulty	Rating:		2.85	(SD	=	1.95)	 Imagine	that	you	have	just	moved	into	a	new	home	and	list	20	items	to	stock	the	kitchen.	










Rating	 Question	 Scale	Points	Affect	 “How	positive	(negative)	do	you	feel	right	now?	 1	–	Not	at	all	positive/negative;	3	–	Somewhat	positive/negative;	5	–	Moderately	positive/negative;		7	–	Very	positive/negative;	9	–	Extremely	positive/negative	Enjoyment	 “How	much	did	you	enjoy	this/these	tasks?”	 1	–	Not	at	all;	3	–	Somewhat;	5	–	Moderately;	7	–	Very	much	9	–	A	great	deal	
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β	(p)	Task	1	Rating	 .028	(>.60)	 -.083	(.145)	 -.083	(.222)	 -.089	(.173)	 .001	(>.90)	Task	2	Rating	 .010	(>.80)	 -.001	(>.90)	 .000	(>.90)	 .050	(>.40)	 .086	(.168)	
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Gl.	Enjoyment	 5.17	(2.32)	 3.25	(2.06)	 8.214	 <	0.001***	Gl.	Difficulty	 4.09	(2.13)	 5.36	(1.98)	 5.801	 <	0.001***	Gl.	Accomp.	 5.92	(2.49)	 4.80	(2.32)	 4.375	 <	0.001***	Gl.	Engagement	 6.51	(2.12)	 4.84	(2.09)	 7.476	 <	0.001***	Gl.	Effort	 7.36	(1.65)	 6.59	(1.62)	 4.443	 <	0.001***	
Table	3.4.	Mean	ratings	and	standard	deviations	for	global	ratings	of	enjoyment,	
difficulty,	accomplishment,	engagement,	and	effort	for	studies	1b	and	3b.	For	Study	3b,	
all	ratings	are	expected,	rather	than	experienced.	Between-groups	t-tests	(df	=	352)	
were	run	to	test	for	differences	in	these	variables.			We	were	again	interested	in	the	task	variables	that	relate	to	future	behavior.	We	began	by	running	a	linear	regression,	which	found	a	significant	positive	correlation	between	affect	change	and	the	desire	to	be	in	a	future	study	(r	=	0.506,	p	<	0.001).	Finally,	we	ran	a	chi-square	test	of	independence	for	order	preferences	and	found	a	significant	difference	between	hard	task	positions	(χ2(4,	n	=	179)	=	34.086,	p	<	0.001,	see	figure	3.6).	For	the	first	time	in	any	of	our	studies,	one	group	(HEE)	showed	a	greater	preference	to	complete	the	hard	task	first	as	opposed	to	last	(46.7%	to	41.7%).	Those	in	both	other	groups	showed	a	strong	preference	to	complete	the	hard	task	last	(64.4	and	60%	in	the	EHE	and	EEH	orders,	respectively).	In	the	EHE	and	EEH	groups,	very	few	participants	wanted	to	complete	the	hard	task	first	(6.7	and	11.6%,	respectively).	
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Figure	3.6.	Participants	were	asked	to	list	their	preferred	order	for	completing	the	tasks.	
Bars	represent	the	percentage	of	responses	for	task	position	when	participants	wanted	
to	complete	the	most	difficult	task	(beginning,	middle,	or	end	of	a	sequence).	These	
results	are	separated	by	when	they	read	about	the	hard	task	(HEE	=	first,	EHE	=	second,	
and	EEH	=	third).	
Summary	–	Studies	3a	and	3b		In	studies	3a	and	3b,	participants	read	about	a	sequence	of	tasks	and	then	rated	how	they	expected	to	feel	upon	completing	them.	As	in	studies	1a	and	1b,	the	position	of	the	hard	task	was	varied	across	the	different	groups.	In	contrast	to	those	who	actually	completed	the	tasks,	we	did	not	see	a	significant	difference	in	affect	change	based	on	the	position	of	the	hard	task.	Thus,	those	in	studies	3a	and	3b	did	not	predict	that	the	orders	would	make	them	feel	differently,	even	though	a	separate	group	of	participants	did	indeed	show	differences	in	affect	change	based	on	hard	task	position.		
This	lack	of	difference	across	orders	was	accompanied	by	a	lack	of	clear	end	effect	when	running	multiple	regressions	to	assess	the	contribution	of	different	task	
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positions	on	final	affect.	However,	we	did	observe	that	a	few	variables	were	significantly	correlated	with	final	affect.	In	both	study	3a	and	3b,	task	2	enjoyment	and	engagement	showed	a	positive	relationship	with	final	affect.	In	study	3a,	we	found	that	task	1	and	3	enjoyment	were	positively	correlated	with	final	affect,	while	task	3	difficulty	was	negatively	correlated.	In	study	3b,	task	1	effort	was	positively	correlated	with	final	affect,	while	task	2	effort	showed	a	negative	correlation.		
In	both	study	3a	and	3b,	those	who	made	predictions	about	the	sequences	thought	they	would	have	a	much	more	negative	change	in	affect	than	those	in	study	1a	and	1b	actually	experienced.	This	was	accompanied	by	a	difference	in	many	global	ratings	between	studies.	In	both	study	3a	and	3b,	participants	predicted	that	the	tasks	would	be	globally	less	enjoyable,	engaging,	and	effortful	than	those	in	study	1a	and	b	experienced	them	to	be.	Additionally,	those	in	study	3b	rated	the	expected	global	difficulty	to	be	higher	and	accomplishment	to	be	lower	than	those	in	study	1a	experienced	them.	In	many	of	these	cases,	these	ratings	were	correlated	with	affect	change	in	a	way	that	would	lead	to	lower	affect	overall.	The	one	exception	was	effort,	which	was	predicted	to	be	lower	in	studies	3a	and	3b	than	it	was	actually	rated	in	studies	1a	and	1b.	However,	effort	exhibited	the	weakest	correlation	with	affect	change	of	all	global	variables	tested.		
Finally,	predicted	affect	change	showed	a	significant	positive	correlation	with	the	desire	for	a	future	study,	similar	to	experienced	affect	change	in	the	other	studies.	In	terms	of	preferences,	a	majority	of	those	in	both	studies	who	read	about	the	hardest	task	second	or	third	wanted	to	complete	it	in	this	position.	However,	those	who	read	
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about	it	first	disproportionately	wanted	to	complete	it	first.	In	study	3b,	the	percentage	of	participants	in	the	HEE	who	wanted	to	complete	it	first	actually	exceeded	the	number	who	wanted	to	complete	it	third.		
In	the	final	section	of	this	dissertation,	the	results	of	all	studies	will	be	integrated	and	discussed.	This	will	include	implications,	limitations,	and	future	directions	that	this	research	may	take.	
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General	Discussion	
Overall	Summary	
	We	started	this	series	of	studies	with	the	broad	question:	Does	the	order	in	which	people	complete	hard	and	easy	tasks	lead	to	differential	changes	in	their	affect?	To	probe	this,	we	initially	ran	two	studies	where	participants	completed	a	sequence	of	one	hard	and	two	easy	tasks	with	minimal	expectations.	Using	two	sets	of	tasks,	we	found	that	those	who	completed	the	hard	task	at	the	end	had	the	greatest	decrease	in	total	affect.	
We	next	performed	two	follow-up	studies	to	better	understand	this	first	set	of	results.	The	first	study	had	participants	complete	a	single	task,	rather	than	a	sequence,	to	determine	its	unique	affective	impacts.	In	isolation,	the	hard	tasks	led	to	a	much	greater	drop	in	total	affect	than	the	easy	tasks.	Regardless	of	difficulty,	all	of	the	tasks	produced	affect	changes	that	were	comparable	to	sequences	that	ended	on	that	same	task.		
The	second	follow-up	study	tested	the	role	of	explicitly	knowing	how	many	tasks	were	in	a	sequence	prior	to	beginning.	We	replicated	our	initial	finding	that	those	who	completed	the	hardest	task	at	the	end	had	the	greatest	drop	in	affect.	We	also	found	a	main	effect	of	group,	where	participants	who	had	an	expectation	about	task	number	had	greater	affect	across	the	board	than	those	who	did	not.		
Finally,	we	wanted	to	know	if	participants	would	predict	affective	differences	from	completing	the	tasks	in	different	orders.	Participants	in	both	studies	did	not	show	significant	differences	in	expected	affect	across	the	orders	in	either	study	3a	or	3b.	
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However,	we	observed	a	main	effect	of	group,	where	participants	predicted	that	all	of	the	orders	would	lead	to	a	greater	drop	in	affect	than	other	participants	actually	experienced	from	completing	them.		
The	results	of	these	studies	demonstrate	the	differences	in	the	experienced	and	predicted	affective	consequences	of	ending	a	sequence	on	the	most	difficult	task.	We	also	used	task	specific	ratings	to	show	that	the	experience	of	the	last	task	in	a	sequence	was	frequently	more	predictive	of	final	affect	than	the	experience	of	the	first	two	tasks.	In	combination	with	the	results	of	the	single	task	study,	these	data	suggest	an	end	effect	in	experienced	task	sequences.	In	contrast	to	those	who	experienced	the	tasks,	we	did	not	see	clear	evidence	for	an	end	effect	in	the	studies	where	participants	made	predictions.	We	also	did	not	observe	that	experienced	or	predicted	affect	change	was	moderated	by	total	task	time,	Grit	scores,	or	Locomotion	scores,	suggesting	that	our	findings	were	consistent	across	individuals	and	that	our	participants	exhibited	the	property	of	duration	neglect.	
Our	results	also	have	implications	for	future	behavior.	For	starters,	our	measure	of	affect	change	showed	a	consistent	positive	relationship	with	the	desire	for	a	future	study,	supporting	the	validity	of	this	measure	for	peoples’	future	actions.	In	terms	of	order	preferences,	there	seemed	to	be	a	default	pattern	where	participants	who	had	just	completed	the	tasks	in	any	order	would	have	preferred	to	complete	the	hardest	task	last.	For	those	who	were	making	predictions	only,	many	of	the	participants	also	wanted	to	complete	a	hard	task	at	the	end.	However,	we	did	observe	differences	between	the	orders	in	both	studies	3a	and	3b.	In	both	cases,	a	higher	percentage	of	
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those	in	the	HEE	order	than	the	other	orders	would	have	preferred	to	complete	the	hard	task	first.	This	result	might	suggest	that	presentation	order	may	be	a	factor	in	shifting	preferences.	More	striking,	the	majority	of	all	participants	in	study	2a	would	have	repeated	the	same	task	they	just	did	–	including	the	difficult	tasks	–	in	a	hypothetical	sequence	with	two	‘easy,’	but	unknown,	tasks.		
We	also	collected	ratings	of	the	global	experience.	In	study	1a,	we	did	not	find	any	differences	across	groups	in	any	of	the	variables	tested.	In	study	1b,	however,	the	EEH	order	was	less	enjoyable	than	both	of	the	other	orders.	It	was	also	less	engaging	and	was	trending	towards	a	lower	sense	of	accomplishment	than	the	HEE	order.	In	studies	2b,	3a,	and	3b,	we	tested	for	differences	in	the	global	experience	between	studies.	In	study	2b,	those	with	prior	knowledge	of	the	task	number	felt	more	accomplished	and	found	it	to	be	more	enjoyable	than	the	without	this	knowledge	in	study	1a.	In	studies	3a	and	3b,	both	groups	who	made	predictions	anticipated	that	the	sequence	would	be	less	enjoyable,	less	engaging,	and	also	less	effortful	than	the	actual	experiences	in	studies	1a	and	1b.	Additionally,	those	in	study	3b	also	predicted	that	the	experience	would	be	more	difficult	and	feel	like	less	of	an	accomplishment	than	those	in	study	1b	did.	These	global	variables	were	significantly	correlated	with	affect	change	in	all	regressions	run.	With	the	exception	of	effort	ratings	in	studies	3a	and	3b,	all	of	the	correlations	were	in	a	direction	that	would	yield	more	positive	affect,	consistent	with	between-study	main	effects.		
The	results	of	studies	1a,	1b,	2a,	and	2b	suggest	that	there	are	consistent	affective	differences	based	on	task	order,	and	that	difficult	tasks	may	lead	to	a	drop	in	affect	
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whenever	they	occur.	Broadly	speaking,	those	who	completed	the	most	difficult	task	at	the	end	of	a	sequence	had	a	greater	decrease	in	total	affect	than	those	who	completed	it	earlier.	This	pattern	was	replicated	in	those	who	knew	that	the	last	task	was	their	final	one,	and	knowledge	of	total	task	number	increased	participants’	affect,	enjoyment,	and	sense	of	accomplishment	overall.	These	data	point	to	an	end	effect,	as	final	task	ratings	had	a	disproportionate	bearing	on	final	affect.	In	spite	of	all	of	this,	participants	generally	preferred	to	complete	the	hardest	and	least	enjoyable	task	at	the	end	of	a	sequence	rather	than	earlier	on.		
Other	participants	read	about	the	tasks	and	did	not	predict	a	difference	in	affect	change	based	on	hard	task	position.	Their	data	also	did	not	exhibit	an	end	effect.	However,	they	consistently	overestimated	the	negative	impacts	of	the	sequences	and	imagined	the	global	experience	to	be	worse	than	it	was	for	those	who	completed	the	tasks.	Similar	to	the	experiencers,	a	majority	of	all	participants	in	both	prediction	studies	wanted	to	save	the	hardest	task	until	the	end.	Interestingly	though,	those	who	had	the	hard	task	described	first	to	them	were	more	likely	to	prefer	completing	it	first	than	those	who	had	it	described	in	different	positions.	In	the	group	that	only	completed	a	single	task,	the	majority	of	participants	who	completed	a	hard	task	would	choose	this	first	in	a	sequence	with	two	other	easy	tasks,	contrary	to	the	findings	of	the	other	studies.		
Limitations	and	Future	Directions		One	important	limitation	of	these	studies	pertains	to	how	long	lasting	our	effects	might	be.	In	our	studies,	we	measured	affect	immediately	after	the	sequence	of	tasks	
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and	did	not	collect	these	data	again	after	a	delay.	Our	findings	suggest	that	the	affective	impacts	of	the	difficult	tasks	we	used	may	subside	during	the	completion	of	an	easy	task.	Additionally,	it	is	possible	that	affect	goes	back	up	to	baseline	after	a	rest	period,	which	we	did	not	give	our	participants	during	these	studies.	Regardless	of	these	possibilities,	many	tasks	may	lead	to	a	significantly	greater	drop	in	affect	than	the	ones	used	in	our	studies.	While	completing	easy	tasks	afterwards	may	not	reset	affect	completely	in	such	a	situation,	it	may	still	leave	the	individual	feeling	better	than	they	would	be	otherwise.	And	if	someone	chronically	leaves	the	most	difficult	task	to	the	end	of	the	workday,	that	person	may	leave	their	office	feeling	worse	than	they	need	to	on	a	daily	basis.	Not	only	does	negative	affect	feel	subjectively	unpleasant,	it	is	also	associated	with	a	range	of	negative	outcomes,	including	self-regulation	failure.	In	a	recent	book	chapter,	Wagner	and	Heatherton	(2015)	referred	to	negative	affect	as	one	of	the	“seven	deadly	threats	to	self-regulation,”	due	to	its	negative	effects	on	working	memory	capacity	and	the	ability	to	consider	long-term	consequences.		
In	addition	to	the	duration	of	affect	changes,	we	also	did	not	test	participants’	short	or	long-term	memory	for	this	experience.	Ideally,	participants	would	remember	what	order	they	completed	the	tasks	in	and	how	this	made	them	feel.	With	this	knowledge,	they	could	make	more	informed	choices	about	when	to	complete	hard	tasks	they	encounter	later.	Future	studies	could	have	participants	complete	a	memory	test	for	both	task	order	and	experienced	affect	change.	Participants	could	complete	this	test	after	a	delay	ranging	from	several	minutes	to	several	weeks	to	
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determine	how	accurately	this	information	is	stored	and	whether	it	varies	by	hard	task	position.		
Another	important	limitation	relates	to	the	stimuli	themselves.	We	selected	tasks	that	were	not	done	for	recreation	and	that	the	average	adult	could	complete	in	a	timely	manner.	We	believe	that	this	was	a	reasonable	simulation	of	a	person	completing	a	series	of	hard	and	easy	tasks	as	they	might	do	in	everyday	life.	However,	we	fully	acknowledge	that	difficult	tasks	can	be	an	enjoyable	challenge	that	leads	to	positive	feelings	(Locke	and	Latham,	1990),	and	that	non-affective	factors	such	as	motivation	or	logistics	may	be	considerations.	Furthermore,	the	tasks	we	used	may	be	idiosyncratic	and	not	represent	the	many	non-cognitive	tasks	that	individuals	perform	in	their	normal	lives.	There	are	also	a	variety	of	other	affective	events	that	people	experience	day-to-day.	From	aversive	pictures	(Denny	et	al.,	2015;	Ochsner	et	al.,	2002)	and	film	clips	(Schotte,	Cools,	and	McNally,	1990)	to	prompts	that	reduce	self-esteem	(Wagner	et	al.,	2012),	psychologists	have	employed	a	variety	of	stimuli	in	their	studies	of	negative	affect.	Future	studies	could	test	whether	similar	results	are	seen	across	domains	using	a	single	aversive	stimulus	and	two	affectively	neutral	ones.	By	including	stimuli	that	are	passively	experienced,	future	studies	may	also	shed	light	on	whether	or	not	our	results	are	due	to	the	active	performance	of	the	tasks	rather	than	a	more	general	property	of	affective	sequences.		
Finally,	we	did	not	collect	data	on	the	predicted	affective	impacts	of	each	of	the	individual	tasks.	Our	results	showed	that	participants	did	not	predict	affective	
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differences	based	on	the	position	of	the	hard	task	within	a	sequence.	However,	we	don’t	know	if	they	overestimated	the	impacts	of	all	tasks	or	just	the	most	difficult	one.	Also,	we	did	not	observe	a	clear	end	effect	in	these	data.	Thus,	participants	are	likely	using	an	internal	model	for	predicted	affect	that	differs	from	the	one	used	during	experiences.	It	would	be	interesting	to	find	out,	for	example,	that	the	sum	of	the	predicted	unique	impacts	of	the	tasks	was	similar	to	the	cumulative	expected	affect	change	for	the	entire	sequence.	A	future	study	could	obtain	these	values	and	better	approximate	the	predicted	impacts	across	the	sequence.	Also,	if	the	predicted	impacts	of	the	easy	tasks	are	substantially	lower	than	those	for	the	hard	tasks,	participants	could	be	encouraged	to	focus	more	on	the	easy	tasks	when	considering	the	effects	of	sequences.	Using	a	similar	method,	Wilson	et	al.	(2000)	directed	participants’	attention	to	other	activities	in	their	future	and	demonstrated	a	reduction	in	impact	bias	for	aversive	events.	
Implications	
Despite	these	limitations,	these	results	have	interesting	implication	for	peoples’	task-related	behavior.	One	implication	is	that	the	affect	from	the	tasks	may	occur	regardless	of	when	a	task	is	completed.	The	drop	in	affect	was	similar	when	participants	completed	a	single	difficult	task	or	when	they	completed	two	easy	tasks	and	then	a	difficult	task.	Similarly,	the	affective	responses	generated	by	the	easy	tasks	were	comparable	when	they	were	completed	on	their	own	or	following	a	difficult	task.	Although	we	did	not	collect	affect	ratings	immediately	after	all	possible	task	positions,	the	single	task	and	sequence	data	provide	evidence	in	
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support	of	the	idea	that	the	affective	impacts	of	the	tasks	are	independent	of	task	position.	These	same	data	also	suggest	that	the	affective	impacts	of	the	hard	and	easy	tasks	are	unchanged	by	sequence	length,	though	future	studies	could	test	this	by	having	participants	complete	varying	numbers	of	consecutive	tasks.		
Another	implication	involves	the	role	of	the	easy	tasks.	When	they	follow	a	difficult	task,	they	seem	to	rebalance	affect	back	to	baseline.	Rather	than	having	a	strong	positive	impact	that	is	directly	opposite	the	difficult	tasks,	our	data	suggest	that	the	easy	tasks	may	have	instead	served	to	cleanse	the	negative	impact	of	the	difficult	tasks.	For	example,	consider	the	affective	change	experienced	after	each	task	in	a	hypothetical	EHE	sequence	(middle	panel	of	figure	4.1	below).		
	
Figure	4.1.	Hypothetical	sequences	of	affect	change.	For	each	task,	the	bars	represent	
the	average	affect	change	produced	by	that	sequence.	The	final	bar	in	plot	represents	
the	average	affect	change	from	sequences	that	ended	on	that	task.		
Using	the	values	from	the	single	task	study,	affect	change	from	these	tasks	may	be	approximately	0,	-2,	and	0,	respectively.	If	these	were	additive,	affect	would	be	0	
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after	the	first	task,	-2	after	the	second	task,	and	then	end	at	-2.	However,	affect	after	the	final	easy	task	was	essentially	at	baseline,	suggesting	a	bounce	back	up	to	0	after	a	drop	in	total	affect.	
These	tasks	then	simultaneously	and	paradoxically	serve	as	a	recent	experience	with	a	neutral	event,	but	also	a	relative	affect	bump	in	the	positive	direction.	In	this	case,	the	bump	could	be	effectively	+2	relative	to	the	previous	task,	even	though	the	task	itself	does	not	increase	positive	affect	by	2	points.	Said	another	way,	these	neutral	tasks	may	have	acted	as	a	form	of	‘chaser’	or	‘pallet	cleanser’	for	the	drop	in	affect	after	the	difficult	tasks.	The	easy	tasks	may	not	make	you	feel	better	on	their	own,	but	they	make	you	feel	most	recently	neutral.		
These	data	may	then	point	to	a	situation	where	if	a	person	does	a	hard	task	last	or	by	itself,	s/he	will	feel	worse	than	before.	But	if	that	same	person	does	an	easy	task	in	isolation	or	at	the	end,	they	may	not	experience	a	significant	change	in	affect	from	baseline.	In	practice,	this	could	involve	not	only	viewing	hard	tasks	as	something	to	complete	early,	but	also	reappraising	easy	tasks	as	something	to	save	for	later.	Alternatively,	if	one	only	needs	to	complete	a	single	and	complex	task,	they	might	consider	performing	the	most	difficult	element	first	if	possible.	Additionally,	our	data	suggest	that	the	simple	knowledge	that	one	is	finished	with	a	sequence	improves	both	the	experience	itself	and	one’s	affect	in	the	aftermath.	With	this	is	mind,	the	optimal	sequence	may	be	one	that	ends	on	an	easy	task	and	has	a	pre-defined	endpoint.		
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However,	this	may	be	only	effective	if	participants	anticipate	a	difference	based	on	hard	task	position	and	are	willing	to	choose	orders	that	will	maximize	their	affective	experience.	The	data	we	collected	suggest	that	unfortunately	participants	neither	seem	to	predict	any	difference	across	the	orders,	nor	do	many	people	choose	to	complete	the	most	difficult	task	at	the	end	of	a	sequence.	Despite	this,	there	were	two	bright	spots	in	terms	of	future	behavior.	The	first	is	that	those	in	studies	3a	and	3b	who	simply	had	the	most	difficult	task	presented	to	them	first	chose	to	keep	this	order	at	a	higher	rate	than	those	who	had	it	presented	later.	We	also	observed	that	participants	who	had	completed	a	single	task	would	repeat	this	in	a	sequence	with	two	hypothetical	‘easy’	tasks.		
These	data	point	to	either	presentation	order	(as	in	Tversky	&	Kahneman,	1981)	or	preference	for	the	known	as	factors	that	may	affect	future	behavior	in	this	domain.	Either	case	would	represent	a	successful	usage	of	an	emotion	regulation	technique	called	‘situation	selection’	(Gross,	1998;	Gross,	2013;	Livingstone	&	Isaacowitz,	2015).	This	strategy	involves	putting	oneself	in	a	more	desirable	situation	that	can	hopefully	prevent	or	dampen	negative	affect	before	it	occurs.	In	this	case,	the	negative	affect	from	the	hard	task	is	unavoidable.	However,	individuals	can	express	a	preference	for	a	situation	where	their	negative	feelings	are	washed	away	by	subsequent	easy	tasks	rather	than	potentially	linger.	Beyond	hard	tasks,	embracing	unavoidable	negative	experiences	earlier	rather	than	later	may	produce	emotional	benefits,	and	we	hope	that	the	results	of	this	research	can	be	used	to	improve	peoples’	affect	and	choices	in	daily	life.
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